This is what the United States altered by military intervention in 2001, and in doing so they salvaged this nation from ruination under Taliban rule. But, the humanitarian motivations were always secondary. The Taliban were providing safe haven, training, and a launching ground for terrorists in the region. They were also, more importantly, existing as testament to the desired goals of Islamic fundamentalists: The Taliban implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the muslim world. As a result, it was the launch pad of attempts to not only attack the western world, but also de-stabilize less extreme muslim forces in the region.
You cannot separate Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Taliban is not Saddam Hussein, and Afghanistan is not Iraq. The September 11th attacks were conceived in, planned, and trained for in Afghanistan:
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Make no mistake, the Taliban will eventually re-take Afghanistan if we do anything other than defeat them at this moment in history. There is no comparable organization that exists in Afghanistan capable of stopping them. While concerns about being drawn into a quagmire are justified, the reality is that our decision to send more troops does nothing to change this reality. We committed to Afghanistan during the invasion in 2001, and even if we were to not send additional troops, extricating ourselves from that country is going to take many years, and in my opinion, decades, if we do not act decisively now.
The greatest military lesson of action in Iraq is that undermanning large scale missions is a recipe for disaster. To quote the Powell Doctrine that successfully guided us in the 1st gulf war, when the United States engages in war, it should use every resource and tool to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing U.S. casualties and ending the conflict by forcing the weaker force the capitulate. Skimping on man power was the principle mistake of the action in Iraq in 2003, and it cost us years of blood and treasure until General Petreaus impressively navigated a more realistic course with much larger troop levels in 2007.
General McChrystal has a good strategy for Afghanistan. He has clear objectives, a realistic outlook, an appreciation of the way the United States is perceived negatively as an occupying force, and remedies to win the hearts and minds of the people. He is committed to less bombing, less civilian casualties, and a greater emphasis on alliances and improving the economy. I cannot conceive of a more comprehensive strategy to win this war, learning from the mistakes and successes of the past in Iraq. While it is right for President Obama to listen to all points of view and weigh the commitment of our brave young and women carefully, it is more important that he pays attention to the facts. The Taliban is our enemy. The Taliban is not Saddam Hussein, or a peripheral tangent in the war on terror. The Taliban is an integral part of the apparatus that attacked the United States on September 11th and seeks, as its principle goal, not death to America, but dominance in the region. The surge worked in Iraq. A failure to surge in Afghanistan now, only makes our enemy stronger, its grip across the nation tighter, and the cost to the United States only greater in the long term.





